You are here > Home / Publications / The evolution of social norms in common property resource use
The evolution of social norms in common property resource use
Abstract
The problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources is examined within an evolutionary-game-theoretic framework. It is shown that cooperative behavior guided by norms of restraint and punishment may be stable in a well-defined sense against invasion by narrowly defined self-interested behavior. The resource-stock dynamics are integrated with the evolutionary-game dynamics. Effects of changes in prices, technology, and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long-run stock are analyzed. When threshold values of the parameters are crossed, social norms can break down leading generally to the lowering of the long-run stock, and possibly to its extinction.
Citation
Sethi, Rajiv and E. Somanathan. 1996. "The evolution of social norms in common property resource use," The American Economic Review, 86:4, pp. 766-788.
Motu code: MEL0504
JEL codes: